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United States oil dependence is a growing concern. Our country relies on imports 
fronl foreign resources to satisfy our increasing demand of petroleum. This paper 
attempts to show the role of foreign oil acquisition in formulating foreign policy. 
Throughout history, oil has been an important factor in international relations with oil 
exporting countries, especially in the Middle East. Now, our dependence leaves the 
United States vulnerable to oil producing countries. The time has come for the United 
States to energetically begin the transition away from a petroleum based society. 
In order to gain an understanding of the oil industry, I first researched the basic 
scientific and geological aspects of petroleum. The bulk ofmy investigation related to the 
history of foreign oil policies. I examined research by leading political analyst and 
articles in respected policy journals. The scope of the paper is limited to the time period 
since World War II, when oil's importance in the United States has increased 
significantly. The focus of this paper is on foreign relations with the Middle Eastern 
exporting countries. I looked at three case studies in particular: Saudi Arabia, the 1973 
Oil Crisis, and Iraq. I evaluated the role oil played in United States foreign policy in 
regard to these cases. Through this paper I demonstrate to Americans the dangers of oil 
dependence and the need to liberate our country's national and energy security. 
My research suggested that oil has been an important factor in foreign policy 
formation with oil exporting countries since World War II. However, it has not 
necessarily been the dominant factor. In some cases, the United States chose other policy 
objectives over the pressures from the oil industry. Foreign policy making is a complex 
process ofbalancing competing ambitions. In this process, oil's role has increased and its 
importance grown. The United States cannot succumb to pressures by oil exporting 
countries to acquire necessary energy resources. The U.S. government must initiate and 
support a transition away from our heavy dependence on oil. This will free our foreign 
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Oil is an important component in the daily lives of most Americans. Oil fuels the 
American troops protecting our country, is an essential ingredient in growing the food we 
eat, helps to heat and light our homes, allows us to transport goods to market, facilitates 
commerce, and provides us with the high quality of life and mobility that we enjoy in the 
United States (Ebel, 2005). However, the United States is becoming increasingly reliant 
on foreign sources of oil to sustain our consumption. While domestic sources of oil are 
depleting, Americans are requiring more. 
As the United States continues to increase the amount of oil it imports, it is 
important to recognize the sources of this energy and the situations surrounding the 
acquisition. In dealing with petroleum exporting countries, the first priority of our 
government is to maintain national security. Over the years, national security and energy 
security have become progressively more interconnected. "Energy security does not stand 
by itselfbut is lodged in the larger relations among nations and how they interact with 
one another" (Yergin, 2006). Thus, energy security impacts our foreign policies. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in the fall of 2005, disrupted the flow of oil and 
gasoline to consumers across the United States. They "sent gas prices soaring and opened 
our eyes to America's dangerous dependence on oil" (Collina, 2005: 2). As a result, the 
time has come to seriously evaluate our nation's reliance on an imported commodity and 
to assess our vulnerabilities. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the connections between U.S. oil 
dependency and related foreign policies and to demonstrate that Americans are 
vulnerable due to their reliance on foreign sources. First, I will show the importance of 
oil to the United States. Next, I will explore how our country's oil dependence has 
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influenced foreign policy, particularly since World War II. While I will briefly describe 
the impact globally, the focus of this paper will be on the countries of the Middle East, 
specifically through case studies. I then examine the 2001 National Energy Policy of the 
Bush administration. I conclude with thoughts and recommendations about our oil 
dependence and approaches to alleviate U.S. vulnerabilities. Although our society will 
continue to use petroleum in a variety of ways for decades to come, it is time to take steps 
to reduce our dependence and move towards new fuels and alternative sources of energy. 
The Importance of Oil 
"No nation which lacks a sure supply of liquid fuel can hope to maintain a 
position ofleadership among the peoples ofthe world. It follows that if the United 
States is to hold the place it now occupies on the world stage as an effective 
leader, ... it must develop a national petroleum policy which will make certain that 
we shall not become dependent upon any other country for our supply of liquid 
fuel. "(Klebanoff, 1974: vi) 
According to the United States Department of Energy (DoE), "Oil is the lifeblood 
of America's economy." Oil is a fundamental source of energy to the United States. It is 
necessary for economic growth and is essential for America's prosperity and national 
security. "Oil is the basis and the moving power of modem industrial society and is 
therefore indispensable" (Klebanoff, 1974: vii). 
Oil is a non-renewable resource that began forming when plant and animal 
remains were covered with layers of rock millions of years ago. Over time, the plants and 
animals decayed to make the black sticky substance we call oil (Pickerill, 2003). As 
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important as oil is to our society, one would hope that discovering it would be fairly easy. 
However, there are restrictions to finding oil. First, geologists must begin looking at the 
correct depth underground. "The rule of thumb says that temperatures 7,500 feet down 
are hot enough to "crack" organic-rich sediments into oil molecules. However, beyond 
15,000 feet the rocks are so hot that the oil molecules are further cracked into natural gas. 
The range from 7,000 to 15,000 feet is called the "oil window"" (Deffeyes, 2001: 8). 
Outside the oil window, there will rarely be oil. Next, geologists must search in specific 
layers of organic rich rocks called source rocks (Deffeyes, 2001: 16). Oil will not be 
found outside of these source rocks. In addition to source rocks, "a reservoir rock with 
both porosity and penneability is a necessary ingredient for a successful oil field" 
(Deffeyes, 2001: 64). Finally, a geologist must find a cap rock which is a sealing layer 
above the oil reservoir. The cap rock keeps the oil from drifting up to the surface 
(Deffeyes, 2001: 64). "If these ingredients are not present, no amount of drilling is going 
to find oil ... This paragraph wipes out 60 percent of the Earth's surface as a potential 
source for oil" (Deffeyes, 2001: 22). Although geologists have gained considerable 
knowledge about each of these necessary components for finding oil, 9 out of 10 
exploration wells are dry (Deffeyes, 2001: 67)! Once an oil field is discovered, the cost of 
drilling the well is only half of the expense. The well must be prepared for production, 
which is equally expensive (Deffeyes, 2001: 102). 
One of the most renowned geologists, M. King Hubbert predicted in the 1960s 
that the world is about to run out of a plentiful and inexpensive supply of oil (Morgan, 
2005). Hubbert also described the detection of oil on a bell curve. The peak of this bell 
curve is called "Hubbert's Peak" (Morgan, 2005). Oil fields are generally good for about 
30 years. The first 15 years are easier for production than the last 15 years, having to dig 
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deeper. It is also less expensive to produce the initial oil. Once you hit the n1idway point, 
production gets more expensive at both the micro and the macro levels. As current oil 
fields are depleted, geologists are beginning to look at much more difficult and expensive 
locations around the world in search of oil (Morgan, 2005). This includes barren and 
remote locations in extreme weather conditions and further out in the ocean. It is 
becoming not only more difficult to find the oil, but also more expensive to produce the 
oil once discovered. 
Hubbert predicted that U.S. oil production would peak in 1970 and that world oil 
production would peak in the year 2000 (Morgan, 2005). He was correct about domestic 
production, and there is reason to believe he is close in his world prediction. First, the 
rate of discovery is decreasing. For every four barrels of oil produced, only one barrel is 
discovered. Discovery is not keeping pace with demand or production. Second, the oil 
companies have decreasing proven reserves. 1 Finally, world production, although 
fluctuations exist, has remained relatively flat since 1998 (Morgan, 2005). 
Many of the world's oil fields have already reached their halfway exploitation 
points. This leads to a substantial increase in production costs (Woolsey, 2004). Also, as 
exploration is pushed further out to sea, the expense increases drastically. "The most 
powerful stimulant for finding more oil would be a reduction in drilling costs" (Deffeyes, 
2001: 88). In addition to the cost of production, the capacity to refine crude oil constrains 
supply (Yergin, 2006). 
Although the world may be reaching a peak in production, the world is not 
running out of oil, yet. In the last twenty-five years, there has been a 70 percent increase 
in known oil reserves. This is due in large part to increased teclmology in discovering 
fields, the capability to remove more oil from a field, and the incentive of higher prices 
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for discovery. "The amount of oil available is not simply a function of geology, but also 
of economics, technology and politics" (Kretzman, 2003). It is a fact that our supplies of 
oil will run out, eventually. However, more important is deciding how much the world is 
willing to pay to retrieve the remaining oil. The United States has mature oil fields, thus 
production costs are often higher than in foreign countries, particularly those in the 
Middle East. "The major obstacle to the development of new supplies is not geology but 
what happens above ground: namely, international affairs, politics, decision-making by 
governments, and energy investment and new technological development" (Yergin, 
2006). Essentially, society should move away from energy dependence long before 
depletion of global oil resources becomes a reality. 
Oil is responsible for supplying more than 40% of our total energy demands and 
almost 100% of transportation fuels (United States DoE, 2006). Of the approximately 20 
million barrels per day (mbd) of oil the United States consumes, only 40 percent is 
domestically produced.2 Over the past ten years, Americans have increased imports to 
meet its greater energy demands (United States National Energy Policy, 2001: 1-1). The 
U.S. has been a net importer ofpetroleum since the 1950s, and our import dependence 
has drastically increased in the last twenty years due to both higher demand and relatively 
low prices for much of this period. "42.2 percent of these imports come from 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 57.8 percent from non­
OPEC countries" ("Where We Stand," 2005). 2.1 million barrels per day and 
approximately 770 million barrels per year of petroleum are delivered to the United 
States by 477 foreign tankers and 64 U.S. flag tankers (United States National Energy 
Policy, 2001: 7-15). The United States consumes a quarter of global oil supply, yet it 
possesses only three percent ofworld oil reserves (Luft, 2005: 1). It is projected that by 
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the year 2020 domestic oil production will decline from 5.8 to 5.1 mbd, yet don1estic 
consumption is projected to rise from 20 to 25.8 mbd (United States National Energy 
Policy, 2001: 1-13). 
The economics of oil has a significant impact on the United States. Since 1997, 
the price of energy as a share of GDP has tripled (Bergsten, 2004). "Every economic 
recession in the past 40 years has been preceded by a significant increase in oil prices" 
(Wirth, Gray, and Podesta, 2003). Federal and state taxes constitute about 30 percent of 
the price of gasoline, refining costs and profits account for 16 percent of the cost and 13 
percent goes to distribution and marketing expenses (United States Embassy, 2002). 
According to President Bush, U.S. dependence on foreign oil is a "foreign tax on the 
American people" (Luft, 2005: 2). Imported oil accounts for a quarter of America's trade 
deficit (Luft, 2005: 2). It is estimated that our oil dependence costs the United States 
about $300 billion per year (Collina, 2005: 5). These funds must be sent abroad instead of 
using the money to invest in our own country. Although, as globalization augments, the 
extent of this condition is uncertain. Petroleum exporting countries often use petrodollars 
to purchase goods from United States companies or invest in United States banks. 
Despite the high costs, Americans continue to demand more. 
Although the population is increasing its use of oil (particularly in the 
transportation sector), 90% of Americans feel our energy dependence is a critical issue 
that "needs to be addressed with urgency" (Luft, 2005: 7). In the United States, citizens 
have become more concerned that the price of oil will be affected by problems abroad. 
Americans believe the U.S. government should be addressing oil dependency more 




Global supply of oil is concentrated geographically. According to the National 
Energy Policy of2001, two-thirds of proven oil reserves are in the Middle East! 
Elsewhere, Central and South America account for 9 percent; Africa, 7 percent; North 
America, 5 percent; Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 5 percent; the rest of 
Asia, 4 percent; and Western Europe, 2 percent" (United States National Energy Policy, 
2001: 1-12). This leaves the future for global energy in the hands of a few producers. 
Many of these countries, the leaders in world oil production, are either ruled by unstable 
governments or do not have good relationships with the United States (Luft, 2005: 4). 
U.S. dependency on these countries for oil is dangerous for our national security. We are 
vulnerable to oil exporting countries that do not have the well being of the United States 
in mind for our energy supplies. "U.S. dependence on oil leaves the country's economic, 
security, and environmental destiny to forces beyond America's control" (Wirth, Gray, 
and Podesta, 2003). In 1976, President Carter's secretary of defense, Harold Brown, 
stated that "there is no more serious threat to the long-term security of the United States 
and to its allies than that which stems from the growing deficiency of secure and assured 
energy resources" (Kretzman, 2003). Twenty years later, this threat has only intensified. 
It is therefore important that the U.S. government keep energy security a priority in our 
national security agenda. 
Since two-thirds of oil reserves are located in the Middle East, this gives 
considerable power to the Arab countries in the region. However, wealth in a natural 
resource such as oil has proven to facilitate underdevelopnlent in many resource-rich 
countries. Many of the oil rich countries of the Middle East are plagued with 
authoritarian governments who keep the oil profits concentrated in the hands of an elite 
few. Oil has been "interpreted as a key instrument of modernization and political 
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emancipation for Arab nationalists, or a long-term financial rent by Muslim traditionalists 
- not to mention a 'weapon' against Israel" (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004: 111). For the 
population, resource wealth is not a blessing, but a curse (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004: 
112). 
Governments in the United States and Western Europe first began to realize the 
importance of oil in the 1910s, when their navies converted from coal to oil for their 
energy supply. Other components of the military quickly followed, and oil was shortly 
thereafter integrated into industrial society. In the early twentieth century, "private 
American corporations accumulated commercial interests in the Middle East, especially 
in the emerging petroleum industry" (Hahn, 2005: 2). Since this time, oil has become an 
increasingly important part of the American way of life. The United States became a net 
in1porter of oil in the 1950s, and subsequently our nation has depended on foreign 
countries, particularly the Middle East, to supply our energy needs. As long as we remain 
dependent for oil, we will be dependent on the Persian Gulf (Kretzman, 2003). 
Consequently, our international relations and foreign policy towards this region is 
particularly significant. 
United States Foreign Policy and Oil 
"Over dependence on anyone source ofenergy, especially a foreign source 
leaves us vulnerable to price shocks, supply interruptions, and in the worst case, 
blackmail. " - President Bush, 2001 (Klare (a), 2004) 
Over the years, many factors have contributed to the evolution of U.S. oil policy 
formation: a series of crises in Iran, culminating in the Iranian revolution during the 
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Carter administration; two wars against Iraq; America's intervention in Afghanistan; the 
ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict; political instability in important exporting countries such 
as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela; the trend in Latin America toward trade and investment 
liberalization during the 1990s; and the threats of terrorism since September 11, 2001 
(Randall, 2005: vii). Upon realizing the importance of oil, the United States has 
formulated policies aimed at obtaining oil, maintaining stable prices, and pursuing 
investment by U.S. oil companies abroad. "In terms of long range goals, United States 
international oil policy shows a remarkable continuity. When it comes to the means 
through which the United States attempted to achieve these aims, however, incoherence 
evidently is a more fitting characteristic" (Bull-Berg, 1987: 7). In order to effectively 
interact with foreign exporting countries, the United States integrated its energy policy 
with its foreign policy. There is a long and complex history of United States foreign 
policy, and this paper will only try to assess portions of foreign policy since World War 
II where there is a correlation with U.S. oil interests. "One of the major dilemmas in 
attempting to assess and trace the evolution of foreign oil policy is to determine the 
relationship of oil to other factors in foreign policy" (Randall, 2005: 2). 
Making foreign policy involves weighing various aspirations: human rights 
standards, trade policies, oil procurement, etc. Foreign policy decision making is rarely a 
consistent, rational process. Formulating oil policy attempts to balance "conflicting or 
competing economic, environmental, and foreign policy objectives" (Ebel, 2005). In 
evaluating the complex process ofpolicy formation, it is difficult to detern1ine which 
factor, if any, is most important. Thus, this assessn1ent of oil's role in Untied States 
foreign policy hypothesizes that oil is an important factor but not prove that oil is the 
definitive factor in developing foreign policy. 
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By the early Cold War, the basic characteristics of U.S. foreign oil policy were 
well established (Randall, 2005: 0). As oil became critical for the militaries of the world, 
the State Department realized the strategic value as the Cold War intensified (Klebanoff, 
1974: 96). Defense alliances were established, and by "linking foreign trade with the 
U.S. military posture, the petroleum industry was singled out in view of its great 
commercial and industrial as well as military possibilities" (Klebanoff, 1974: 96). The 
government also believed that establishing trade relationships with countries would be 
beneficial in bolstering alliances, especially in regions where Soviet expansion was a 
concern. The tactical importance of the Middle East increased as the West attempted to 
contain Soviet influence in Europe and Asia (Hahn, 2005: 7). 
"The Gulfs significance increased greatly during the cold war due to the 
prevalence of oil in the region. A broad U.S. policy ofmaintaining stability in the Gulf 
emerged so as to ensure the easy access to and safe transport of oil from the region while 
keeping the Soviets at bay" (Lesch, 2003: 311). It was vital Cold War policy to deny the 
petroleum resources of the Middle East to the Soviet Union. The United States intended 
to use these resources to stin1ulate the economic restoration and renewal of Japan and 
Europe post WWII. The government also planned to use Middle East petroleum as oil 
reserves in case of international emergency (Hahn, 2005: 7). The region's balance was 
maintained through Iran's strength and the wealth of Saudi Arabia (Lesch, 2003: 311). 
According to Robert Ebel, Chainnan of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies Energy Program, the United States energy security policy has four features: 
1) promoting development of diverse energy supplies; 2) at times encouraging efficiency, 
conservation, and alternative sources of energy; 3) the establishment of the strategic 
petroleum reserve and sharing infonnation through the International Energy Agency; and 
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4) depending on Saudi Arabia to moderate price and supply instability. Additionally, we 
have at times "been moved to call on America's military to defend facilities, protect 
transit routes and secure inhospitable areas" (Ebel, 2005). Two of the strategic interests 
the United States has in relation to the Persian Gulf are preventing countries unfriendly to 
the United States from controlling petroleum resources and the Strait of Hormuz and 
guaranteeing access to the energy reserves in the Gulfby the United States and our allies 
(Lesch, 2003: 406-407). 
One of the problems of foreign policy in relation to our oil dependence is that 
many of the energy sources in the Middle East are umeliable or unstable. "The vast oil 
wealth of the Persian Gulf is a key dimension of geopolitics in the Middle East and an 
emblematic prize of so called 'resource wars'" (Le Billon and EI Khatib, 2004: 109). If 
the petroleum resources of the Middle East were controlled by aggressive powers, our 
foreign policy must reflect not only our desire for oil, but also our political position 
against the hostile control. 
Many analysts argue that since Franklin Roosevelt met with Saudi King Abdul 
Aziz ibn Saud in 1945, United States foreign policy has acquiesced to our oil 
dependence. They feel that American values were compromised in exchange for 
indulging foreign leaders controlling vast hydrocarbon resources, even if the leaders were 
oppressive tyrannical rulers (Luft, 2005: 1). "The flow of funds to certain oil-producing 
states has financed widespread corruption, perpetuated repressive regimes, funded radical 
anti-American fundamentalism, and fed hatreds that derive from rigid rule and stark 
contrasts between rich and poor" (Wirth, Gray, and Podesta, 2003). The United States oil 
vulnerability keeps our foreign policy indebted to a handful of exporting countries and in 
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order to meet increasing demand, we will at times be forced to militarily intervene in the 
region (Bergsten, 2004). 
The profits oil exporting countries receive for selling their petroleum resources 
are called petrodollars. As oil prices rise, these profits find their way to "the jihadists 
committed to America's destruction as [they] trickle their way through charities and 
government handouts to madrassas and mosques, as well as outright support of terrorist 
groups" (Luft, 2005: 2). This undermines the strategic relationship the United States has 
with the oil producers in the Persian Gulf. In the war on terrorism, the United States can 
peculiarly be seen as funding both sides. The government first sponsors countries in the 
Free World defending against terrorism through tax dollars. Then it indirectly funds 
terrorist groups and hostile regimes through the profits they receive from selling the 
United States petroleum (Luft, 2005: 2). Some of the Middle East nations are accused of 
sponsoring or being allied with radical Islamists who conspire against the U.S. 
"Petrodollars... have been used to sponsor terrorism, produce weapons of mass 
destruction and build schools preaching hatred of America and its values" (Luft, 2003). 
Yet another problem of oil dependence is protecting United States interests and 
investments abroad. Foreign policy must reflect our intentions to maintain foreign assets 
and our willingness to defend pipelines, tanker fleets, and U.S. companies operating 
abroad. A robust foreign policy would "strive to deny a potential enemy access to the 
foreign oil, and it will do everything in its power to assure access to friends" (Klebanoff, 
1974: vii). However, the presence of U.S. military in the Persian Gulf is not generally 
welcomed. It creates resentment by the population and invites more terrorist attacks 
(Collina, 2005: 4). One method of involvement has included providing friendly countries 
with arms in order to defend themselves. "Providing the regimes in question with 
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sophisticated weapons may be good for the oil importers' balance of payments, but it 
does not necessarily do much for security, especially as the weapons may fall into the 
wrong hands" or a regime change empowers a hostile government (Houthakker, 1981: 
320). Many Americans are concerned about the price they must pay to secure oil supplies 
from these foreign countries. They worry not only about the monetary cost, but also the 
lives and U.S. credibility that is sacrificed (Barnes, Jaffe, and Morse, 2003). It costs about 
$60 billion per year to sustain the United States military presence in the Persian Gulf 
alone, and "outside the United States the view is growing that assuring the flow of oil 
does not require a significant military strategy" (Telhami, 2002). Additionally, the United 
States puts itself at greater risk of involvement in local conflicts by intruding in the 
affairs of petroleum exporting countries (Klare (a), 2004). 
President Jimmy Carter announced in 1980 "that the secure flow of oil from the 
Persian Gulfwas in "the vital interests of the United States of America" and that America 
would use "any means necessary, including military force" to protect those interests from 
outside forces" (Collina, 2005: 3). This Carter Doctrine has been the basis for military 
involvement in oil foreign policy ever since. As a result, the U.S. has attempted to use the 
military to address oil vulnerability through measures to support or install friendly 
governments. Soon after the declaration of the Carter Doctrine, the United States Rapid 
Deployn1ent Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was fonned. The RDJTF later became U.S. 
Central Command (USCENTCOM). Through the establishment of CENTCOM, the 
government indicates that it will assert the use of force on the basis of the Carter 
Doctrine. The deployment of U.S. military forces in the Middle East, an area not covered 
by NATO, correlates closely to the presence of oil in the region (Kretzman, 2003). "U.S. 
policy with regard to the protection ofPersian Gulf energy supplies is unambiguous: 
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When a threat arises, the United States will use whatever means are necessary to ensure 
the continued flow of oil" (Klare (a), 2004). 
One criticism of current oil foreign policies is the close relationship between the 
administration and the private oil industry. The Bush family has been in the oil business 
since 1950. George Bush Sr. even visited Saudi Arabia while he was Vice President to 
plead for oil price stability. Vice President Dick Cheney was CEO of the world's largest 
oil services company, Halliburton. Donald Evans, the Secretary of Commerce, was the 
CEO of a natural gas company; and Secretary of State (former National Security 
Advisor) Condoleezza Rice had an oil tanker named after her due to her position on the 
board of Chevron. There is no denying the administration's knowledge and connection 
with the energy sector. Yet these relationships "don't prove that the industry decides our 
every foreign policy move" (Cave, 2001). One argument is that given the oil's 
importance to U.S. national security and economy, it is beneficial to have an 
administration with extensive experience with oil. Only time and objective analysis will 
determine if the current Bush administration's oil ties have benefited our foreign policy 
or put the United States in further harm of oil dependency. 
A unique relationship exists between three parties involved in the "oil triangle": 
the United States, the international oil companies, and the oil exporting government. At 
various times through history each has had supremacy over the others. It is a dynamic 
relationship with each party pressuring the other two to submit to its desires. The United 
States wants to ensure access to plentiful oil at a reasonable and stable price in addition to 
foreign policy objectives such as human rights and strategic political issues. The oil 
companies want to increase their shares in foreign oil investments. They want to increase 
their profits. They want to be protected by the U.S. government, and they want the U.S. 
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goven1lllent to create foreign policy in compliance with their host oil exporting countries. 
The oil exporting nations want to control their natural resource and nlaximize profits 
from the sell of oil. They want to use their energy power to pressure importing countries 
to adopt foreign policies which would benefit them, and they want to utilize the abilities 
of oil companies without granting them additional authority. This unique relationship is 
constantly evolving, and determining who wields the most control is often a matter of 
perception. One observation is that "foreign oil policy could be, and indeed generally 
was, remarkably successful as long as the strategic objectives of state planners and the 
profit motives of the companies coincided" (Randall, 2005: 1). 
Former Department of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham proclaimed that "the 
Bush administration is committed to ensuring that U.S. energy needs are not held hostage 
by politically unstable foreign suppliers" (United States Embassy, 2002). Accordingly, 
the United States refuses to submit to oil exporting countries. Even some of the most 
conservative administrations (who are seen as favoring oil interests) have chosen foreign 
policies at the expense of the oil industry - such as containment of the Soviet Union as 
opposed to oil industry investment in the USSR. "Aspects of Bush's energy plan suggest 
that even this administration will not break the give-and-take pattern" (Cave, 2001). One 
indication that the oil industry has lost some power over time is the problems that 
American antitrust laws gave oil companies. These laws prevent the companies from 
establishing monopolies abroad and prevent the U.S. government from providing political 
advice to private corporations (Randall, 2005: 272). 
Unlike some other oil importing countries, the United States prohibits oil 
companies from doing business with some of the world's worst human rights violators, 
such as Iran. "In the global contest for oil the U.S. loses ground as a result of its pressure 
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for government reform" (Luft, 2005: 4). However, as oil demand increases and domestic 
oil expires, petroleum interests in the United States may take precedence over other 
foreign political objectives in the policies with oil exporting countries. 
United States Oil Suppliers Outside the Middle East 
Although the focus of this paper is on United States foreign oil policy in relation 
to the Middle East, the United States relies on a variety of sources for our petroleum 
supply. Accordingly, before evaluating the specific Persian Gulf cases, I would be ren1iss 
not to mention some of the important suppliers of United States oil outside the Middle 
East: 
The Persian Gulf is important to the United States because of the immense proven 
reserves it holds. However, Canada is actually the leading supplier of oil to the United 
States! In 2000, 15 percent of oil imports came from our northern neighbor (United States 
National Energy Policy, 2001: 8-4). The United States has placed greater importance on 
regional sources and strengthening relationships with oil exporters within the western 
hemisphere. Canada has considerable heavy oil sands reserves, and the country is critical 
in providing oil for the New England states. "The Bush administration is moving in a new 
direction by building a stronger partnership with Canada and Mexico. A major 
undertaking in this area, the North American Energy Initiative, aims at developing 
policies to enhance energy security, trade and interconnections between the three 
countries" (United States Embassy, 2002). 
Mexico accounted for 120/0 of U.S. oil imports in 2000. It also holds 
approximately 25% more proven reserves than the Untied States (United States National 
Energy Policy, 2001: 8-9). Major increases in Latin American oil output are blocked by 
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regulatory, political and environmental barriers. "Foreign oil interests were expropriated 
in favor of the national oil company, Pemex" in Mexico during 1938 (Houthakker, 1981: 
32). Mexico and Venezuela "have placed their energy reserves under state control, 
establishing strong legal barriers to foreign involvement in domestic oil production" 
(Klare (b), 2004). However, the United States is encouraging Mexico to open investments 
to America's private sector where possible. 
Venezuela provided 14% of United States oil imports in 2000. It is America's 
third largest oil supplier, and it is the fifth largest global oil exporter (United States 
National Energy Policy, 2001: 8-10). The United States continues to pursue investments 
in Venezuela's oil sector and encourage bilateral trade arrangements. It has the benefit (as 
do Mexico and Canada) of being geographically close to the United States, and the 
country has significant oil reserves. 
In the 1970s, the United States modified its oil import program under the Nixon 
administration so as not to discriminate against Venezuela in its foreign oil policy. "The 
modification of policy was intended in part to strengthen U.S. petroleum trade with 
Venezuela and the other Latin American countries" (Randall, 2005: 285). Venezuela 
notably refrained from participating in the 1973 oil embargo against the United States. 
One problem with Venezuela's energy sector is that its oil company is state owned, 
making it susceptible to corruption and manipulation. In late 2002 and early 2003, a 
general strike in Venezuela "severely constricted the flow of oil and gasoline for several 
months" and kept around 200 million barrels of petroleum from global oil markets 
(Billig, 2004). This crisis was a hurdle in the U.S. attempt to diversify sources away from 
the Middle East. Venezuela is an essential component to Washington's goals of 
diversification and hemispheric oil cooperation. The United States aggravated the 
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relationship with Caracas in 2002 when the U.S. government hastily supported an interim 
government in Venezuela when President Hugo Chavez was briefly removed from office. 
Upon his return, tensions escalated with the United States. Despite unfriendly 
relationships between the U.S. and Venezuela, America attempts to maintain a strong 
trading partnership. 
Colombia is the seventh largest importer to the United States (United States 
National Energy Policy, 2001: 8-4). The country is continuing to develop its oil 
production capabilities. The Bush administration apportioned $98 million in 2002 for the 
deployment of Special Forces troops to Colombia. These troops were to "train a "Critical 
Infrastructure Brigade" of Colombians for the explicit purpose ofprotecting an 
Occidental Petroleum pipeline" (Kretzman, 2003). It is also speculated that U.S. 
involvement in the civil war in Colombia was motivated by the country's oil resources. 
Africa is also important to the United States in its efforts to diversify petroleum 
sources. Sub-Saharan Africa holds 70/0 ofproven world oil reserves, and Nigeria is the 
fifth largest exporter to the United States (United States National Energy Policy, 2001: 8­
4). West Africa is expected to be a growing source of oil to the United States. The United 
States is encouraging investment in Africa to develop production capacities. The problem 
of political instability is a problem in many African countries rich with oil resources. 
Outside of OPEC, Russia is the world's largest oil exporter. It is second in total 
global exports to Saudi Arabia (Barnes, Jaffe, and Morse, 2003). Russia holds 5% of the 
world's oil reserves and is the world's third largest oil producer (United States National 
Energy Policy, 2001: 8-13). "U.S. - Russian cooperation on energy in general and oil in 
particular has been high on the agenda of Bush-Putin summits that began in the summer 
of2001 and culminated in the creation of a U.S.-Russian Energy Dialogue" (Barnes, 
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Jaffe, and Morse, 2003). Russia has opened the energy sector to foreign investment, and 
production is predicted to continue increasing. 
The U.S. has encouraged reform in Russia over "the state oil pipeline monopoly 
Transneft and its pipeline sector, but reform is slow in coming" (Barnes, Jaffe, and 
Morse, 2003). Russian concerns include supply stability, especially considering the 
Yukos case. Russia has increasingly become an important exporter to our European 
allies, and an increase in Russian oil production would benefit all importing countries by 
reducing the share of OPEC oil in the n1arket. Continued discussions and stronger 
partnerships are expected between Washington and Moscow concerning Russia's 
petroleum resources and development ofproduction capabilities. 
The United States has become increasingly interested in the Caspian region as an 
alternative source of energy. The U.S. has worked closely with the region to develop 
commercially viable export routes for its oil supply. The United States was "reluctant to 
see Caspian oil flow through Russia on its way to Westen1 Europe, since that would 
allow Moscow a degree of control over Western energy supplies. Transport through Iran 
was prohibited by U.S. law" (Klare (b), 2004). The result was a plan to develop a pipeline 
from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan in Turkey through Tbilisi in the former Soviet 
republic of Georgia. The United States "has a strategic interest" in the construction of the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline "because diversification of both energy supplies 
and export routes will benefit both" the Caspian countries and "the energy security of the 
Western world" (Gvosdev, 2003). 
"The major problem facing the United States is that the Caspian basin is no more 
stable than the Persian Gulf' (Klare (b), 2004). The Caspian region has a history of 
political instability. The countries are susceptible to corruption and government 
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manipulation in the oil sector. They do not have an adequate legal or economic 
framework for the oil industry. The countries of the Caspian Sea region must address 
serious internal structural issues before these nations can substantially increase oil 
production. 
"The [Clinton] administration initiated a number ofn1ilitary assistance programs 
aimed at strengthening their internal security capabilities. This entailed providing arms 
and training along with conducting joint exercises" (Klare (b), 2004). Subsequently, the 
United States has provided Caspian countries support for the War on Terror and military 
assistance to increase their security since September 11, 2001. The U.S. government has 
been working actively to secure possible pipeline routes to export petroleum from the 
region. In 2001, Washington promised over $4 million to Azerbaijan in military aid for 
the fight against terrorism. The Azerbaijani president stated "Guaranteeing the security of 
the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum oil and gas pipelines is an integral 
part of our struggle against terrorism" (Kretzman, 2003). The U.S. also promised $64 
million to Georgia in 2001 for military support. In addition, the United States pledged to 
dispatch 180 Special Forces "advisers" to train up to 2,000 Georgians in anti-terrorism 
techniques;" this training might include protection and security for the BTC pipeline 
(Kretzman, 2003). 
Foreign Policy Divergence from Oil Interests 
The US oil objectives have "frequently conflicted with other US foreign policy 
interests. The greater need for oil in the future is at odds with some of the US-driven 
policies towards 'rogue' petro-states" (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004: 126). There are 
distinct cases where the United States foreign policy goes directly against what would 
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benefit U.S. oil companies and the United States relating to oil acquisition. "Sanctions ­
imposed notably by the US on Iran, Libya, or Sudan - ... reflect the fact that energy 
policy and business interests are not the only factors in detennining foreign policy 
towards oil-producing states" (Le Billon and EI Khatib, 2004: 113). Sanctions throughout 
history have resulted in significant profit losses for oil companies and have considerably 
cut the amount of oil available for import to the United States. 
United States foreign policy towards Israel is the most definitive case of political 
policy factors taking precedence over oil dependence. Washington has continuously 
supported Israel in its defense against Arab countries (many ofwhich are major oil 
exporting nations). As a result, the United States has at times suffered extreme economic 
losses and been subject to embargoes. The pro-Israeli position has been an area of 
contention with Arab producing nations. U.S. oil companies have even lobbied on behalf 
of the Arab position in disputes with Israel in order to improve their standing with these 
petroleum producers. Yet the United States has remained steadfast in support of Israel. If 
this condition changes, one factor in the transfonnation might be that "the stability of the 
oil area is acquiring greater importance for U.S. strategic interests as Israel's strategic 
value as an anti-Soviet bulwark in the Middle East becomes less relevant" (Lesch, 2003: 
279). Washington is compelled to energetically pursue a resolution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict that will satisfy both sides. A resolution to the Arab-Israeli problem will alleviate 
pressures from the Middle Eastern oil exporters and will improve Washington's 




The Middle East contains approximately two-thirds of the world's proven oil 
reserves. Consequently, the petroleum resources of the Persian Gulf region are, and will 
continue to be, important for the United States. The following are three case studies 
related to oil and foreign policy in the Middle East. Through these I hope to illustrate the 
relationship between Washington and Middle Eastern petroleum exporting countries. 
These case studies are noteworthy, but they are limited, and they do not intend to 
disregard other Middle Eastern countries with significant oil resources - Iran, Kuwait, the 
UAB, etc. 
Saudi Arabia 
((Persian Oil ... is yours. We share the oil ofIraq and Kuwait. As for Saudi 
Arabian oil, it's ours. " - President Roosevelt to British Ambassador, 1944 
(Yergin, 1991: 401). 
Saudi Arabia currently supplies approximately 14% of U.S. oil imports and about 
8% of total U.S. demand. It is the second largest importer to the United States. Saudi 
Arabia "holds just over one quarter of all the oil in the world. Saudi Arabia has proven 
reserves of264 billion barrels of oil, and possible reserves that are estimated by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration to be as high as one trillion barrels. The Saudis have 
the world's largest production capacity and the largest excess production capacity" 
(Kretzn1an, 2003). Daily, Saudi Arabia produces around 8 million barrels of crude oil. 
Not only is Saudi oil important to the United States and the global market, oil is an 
important factor within the kingdom. Profits account for 90-95 percent of Saudi Arabia's 
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total export earnings; oil revenues make up 35-40 percent of the kingdom's GDP; and 
they comprise 70 percent of state revenues (Le Billon and EI Khatib, 2004: 119). 
Despite its involvement in the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi Arabia has been one of 
the most reliable exporters by providing the world with oil when needed. Saudi Arabia is 
the most plentiful, dependable, and secure source of oil not only in the Middle East, but 
globally (Ebel, 2005). "For these reasons, the oil market revolves around Saudi Arabia. 
For U.S. geopolitical strategists, this dependence on Saudi Arabia is a major vulnerability 
which fundamentally shapes U.S. military policy" (Kretzman, 2003). 
As oil gained importance in the U.S. economy, "Saudi Arabia became the 
dominant focus of American policymakers" (Yergin, 1991: 427). The relationship 
between Washington and Riyadh dates back to World War II when in 1943 President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt declared Saudi Arabia a vital interest to the United States, thus 
making it qualified for assistance through the Lend-Lease program (Hahn, 2005 : 9-10). 
Then in 1945, the President "forged an agreement with Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, the founder 
of the modem Saudi dynasty, to protect the royal family against its internal and external 
enemies in return for privileged access to Saudi oil" (Klare (b), 2004). This "special 
relationship" was defined by the oil for security exchange between the countries. After 
this arrangement, the United States was able to assert a principle position in the Middle 
East. Then in 1950 the United States agreed to the 50-50 deal with Saudi Arabia. This 
arrangement granted the Saudi king a greater share of the Arabian American Oil 
Company's (Aramco) revenues in order to secure the flow of oil (Hahn, 2005: 10). The 
State Department "was a strong proponent of meeting Saudi demands" (Yergin, 1991: 
446). Roosevelt's promise still stands, and "the use ofmilitary power to protect the flow 
28 

of oil has been a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy since 1945" (Collina, 2005: 3). This 
agreement to a large degree governs our relations with Saudi Arabia to this day. 
The 1973 oil embargo on the United States by the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) complicated the relationship with Saudi 
Arabia. For the United States, it was important that the largest oil producer not participate 
in embargoes against the U.S. The brief confrontation between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia ended quickly. By early 1974, before the embargo was formally lifted, the 
United States and Saudi Arabia negotiated a bilateral agreement to end the kingdom's 
participation in the embargo (Bull-Berg, 1987: 58). As a result of the embargo, the 
increase in oil prices made Saudi Arabia even more critical to policyn1akers in 
Washington. The United States position in Saudi Arabia was bolstered because of its 
economic importance. The U.S. was not only a large consumer of Saudi oil, but it was an 
ideal location for Saudi oil revenues. "Saudi petrodollars were recycled through U.S .... 
banks, the Saudi government became a major purchaser ofU.S . Treasury bonds, and 
Saudi private wealth found investment opportunities in the United States" (Lesch, 2003: 
362-363). 
"The new oil wealth deepened the Saudi linkages to the United States" (Lesch, 
2003: 362). Militarily, Saudi Arabia bought the majority of its arms fron1 the United 
States. The kingdom then used U.S. training missions to train Saudi troops in the new 
weaponry. Additionally, large building projects were completed by the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers throughout Saudi Arabia. As its oil wealth and proven reserves increased, 
the kingdom realized the importance of the United States as an outside guardian. Saudi 
Arabia requested that the United States exhibit its military comn1itn1ent to the kingdom in 
1979. The Iranian revolution was developing nearby, and Saudi royalty feared a sin1ilar 
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rebellion. The United States responded by sending a squadron ofF-15s as a military 
display. A year later the Iran-Iraq war broke out, and in October 1980, "U.S. AWACS 
(airborne warning and control system) aircraft were dispatched to the kingdom to 
strengthen its air defenses" (Lesch, 2003: 362). During this war, Iran attacked both Saudi 
and Kuwaiti oil tankers and shipping vessels. The United States reacted by sending naval 
ships to the Gulf in 1987 to protect our allies (Lesch, 2003: 362). Finally, the U.S. 
urgently sent troops to protect the kingdom when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. 
The flow of money from American pockets to Saudi Arabia and U.S. military 
presence in the region are not always beneficial to the United States. "It is widely 
accepted that Saudi Arabia's oil wealth has directly enabled the spread ofWahhabism" 
(Luft, 2005: 2). The kingdom uses petrodollars to sponsor its own brand of 
fundamentalist Islam throughout the Middle East. Osama Bin Laden justified the terrorist 
attacks by mostly Saudi terrorists on September 11 "by the oil-related presence of US 
troops on the 'Holy Soil' of the Arabian Peninsula and the moral corruption of the oil­
rich Saudi regime" (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004: 116). There is wide popular 
discontent within Saudi Arabia over the kingdom's friendship with Washington. Many 
also feel the House of Saud is corrupt and condemn the family's wealth and position, 
which is maintained by conceding to U.S. pressure. Saudi Arabians criticize the presence 
of U.S. military in their country. Bin Laden echoes these sentiments and recruits from the 
angry Saudi citizens. "The Saudis fear that if their citizens again perpetrate a terror attack 
in the U.S., there would be no alternative for the U.S. but to terminate its long-standing 
commitment to the monarchy - and perhaps even use military force against it" (Luft, 
2005: 3). In order to preclude this outcome, the Saudis n1ust search for new countries in 
need of oil that will be willing to protect the kingdom. 
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Clearly Saudi Arabia has no desire for the importance of oil to diminish. "Saudi 
Arabia's goal is to assure that oil's role in the international economy is maintained as 
long as possible. Hence Saudi policy has always denounced efforts by industrialized 
countries to wean themselves from oil dependence, whether through tax policy or 
regulation" (Morse and Richard, 2002). Consistently, the kingdom discourages oil 
importing countries from creating and maintaining large oil reserves, like the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve in the United States. These reserves could weaken Saudi Arabia's 
ability to affect prices and provides the importing country with some flexibility 
(Houthakker, 1981: 317). 
Saudi Arabia has close to 3 million bid spare capacity (Morse and Richard, 
2002). This is enough to replace the oil exports of another major petroleum exporting 
country in the global market. This spare capacity can benefit the United States by 
stabilizing the oil market in times of crisis, yet it can also be used against the United 
States. "Saudi spare capacity is the energy equivalent ofnuclear weapons, a powerful 
deterrent against those who try to challenge Saudi leadership and Saudi goals. It is also 
the centerpiece of the U.S.-Saudi relationship" (Morse and Richard, 2002). Saudi 
Arabia's spare capacity makes oil importing countries like the United States reliant on 
Riyadh for energy security. 
President Roosevelt's assurance of America's protection of the House of Saud has 
extended since WWII and remains the foundation for Washington's "special relationship" 
with Saudi Arabia today. Saudi Arabia will remain the most vital oil exporter not only in 
the Middle East but in the world due to its production capability, its spare capacity, and 
its immense proven reserves. As such, oil will continue to playa principal role in U.S. 
foreign policy making with Saudi Arabia. However, Washington must be careful not to 
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incense the Saudi population by its military presence and supporting the, often repressive, 
House of Saud. It is more likely for the United States to assist in stabilizing the country 
rather than endeavoring to create reforms or revolution (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004: 
131). Although a multitude of factors are considered when developing foreign policy, it is 
likely the United States will continue to push democratic and human rights issues behind 
our energy needs when dealing with Saudi Arabia. "It was an unlikely union - Bedouin 
Arabs and Texas oil men, a traditional Islamic autocracy allied with modem American 
capitalism. Yet it was one that was destined to endure" (Yergin, 1991: 428). 
Our extensive relationship with Saudi Arabia will surely continue. If current 
petroleum trends continue in the United States, the kingdom's importance to U.S. energy 
demands will only increase. The U.S. must keep Saudi Arabia's security at the top of our 
national security agenda. However, it is important that the United States begin moving 
away from oil dependence. Doing so would allow Washington greater freedom in 
designing policies based on other objectives above and beyond oil procurement toward 
Saudi Arabia. Until a time when the United States is less reliant on Saudi Arabia for 
current and future energy needs, Washington must stress the importance of maintaining a 
strong relationship with Riyadh, protecting our interests, stabilizing the kingdom, and 
carefully diminishing criticism and resentment by the Saudi population. 
1973 Oil Crisis 
British Petroleum and Standard Oil, two major international oil corporations, 
decided to reduce oil prices in 1959 to the shock of their host oil exporting countries. The 
effect was enormous. A year later, in response, the n1ajor oil producing countries 
collaborated to establish the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
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OPEC claimed its intent was to stabilize prices by controlling production. The creation of 
OPEC is significant because it meant that these countries would be working together to 
create oil policies. At the time of conception, the OPEC countries accounted for 80 
percent of world oil exports (Randall, 2005: 264)!3 
The reaction of the United States was to adopt "a policy of neutrality and non­
commitment toward OPEC fron1 its inception" (Randall, 2005: 270). U.S. policymakers 
and analysts believed that the organization would not survive long due to the "unholy 
alliance' among Venezuela, Indonesia, and Iraq" who each had very different 
goven1ffients and ideologies (Randall, 2005: 272). Over the next couple of years as OPEC 
endured, the U.S. reassessed its stance toward OPEC and decided to initiate a functional 
relationship in hopes to improve the U.S. position with global oil exporters. Washington 
realized that oil companies could benefit from certain OPEC policies. OPEC began to 
gain control in global energy markets in the early 1970s (Houthakker, 1981: 314). The oil 
cartel demonstrated cohesion in deciding production levels and prices. 
In addition to OPEC, there is a separate organization for Arab petroleum 
exporting countries (OAPEC). The two groups were similar, but OAPEC consisted of 
only the Arab countries of OPEC. It was OAPEC that declared the oil embargo on the 
United States and the Netherlands in October of 1973. These Arab states were punishing 
the United States for its support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The oil ministers 
"agreed to use oil as a weapon in the war, thus mandating a cut in exports and ... in 
production" (Randall, 2005: 288). The embargo had the effect of quadrupling global 
crude oil prices (Houthakker, 1981: 314). It also resulted in making "the Arab-Israeli 
conflict over the nationhood of Israel, the sovereignty of Palestine, and the status of 
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Jerusalem stand out as the set of regional enmities that most seriously affected the oil 
system" (Bull-Berg, 1987: 103). 
The American oil companies with interests in the Middle East were worried about 
Washington's position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. These companies urged the 
administration "to adopt a less pro-Israeli position" (Randall, 2005: 287). Richard Nixon, 
who was President at the time, was not affected by their pleadings, despite the fact that he 
had received campaign support from the oil industry (Randall, 2005: 287). Even the 
Petroleum Minister of Saudi Arabia had warned Aramco that "if the U.S. does not stay 
out of this conflict, the U.S. is finished in the Middle East" (Randall, 2005: 276). 
However, before the embargo, the administration felt that their access to foreign oil was 
guaranteed since most of the Arab producing countries relied on profits from exports to 
the United States (Randall, 2005: 269-70). 
"At the rhetorical level, the United States acted quickly and forcefully to counter 
the exasperation created by the 1973-4 oil embargo" (Bull-Berg, 1987: 3): 
Let us unite in committing the resources ofthis nation to a major new 
endeavor, an endeavor that in this bicentennial era we can appropriately 
call (Project Independence, ' ... Let us set as our national goal, in the spirit 
ofApollo, with the determination ofthe Manhattan Project, that by the end 
ofthis decade we will have developed the potential to meet our own energy 
needs without depending on any foreign energy sources ... We have an 
energy crisis, but there is no crisis ofthe American spirit. 
-President Richard Nixon, November 7, 1973 
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Washington initially responded by developing short-tenn and long-tenn measures 
to affect market behavior and the politics of oil (Bull-Berg, 1987: 7). The Nixon 
administration made considerable domestic policies in response to the 1973 embargo: 
Americans were asked to tum down their thennostats, conserve electricity, and reduce 
driving speeds (Randall, 2005: 288). Canada and the U.S. began protecting the domestic 
oil market by setting price controls. This exacerbated the econonlic, political, and energy 
situation in other oil inlporting countries who, like the Europeans and Japanese, "not only 
allowed the world price to prevail domestically, but increased indirect taxes on petroleum 
products" (Houthakker, 1981: 330). The U.S. was determined to control the price of oil 
and not let OPEC be the dictator. The most critical foreign policy objective was to 
convince the largest producer, Saudi Arabia, to conclude its embargo on the United States 
and to resume production at levels that would stabilize oil prices (Bull-Berg, 1987: 58). 
President Nixon took the lead as the embargo continued to deteriorate the energy 
and economic situation of the United States and other oil importing countries (Randall, 
2005: 288). He brought these countries together at the Washington Energy Conference in 
1974. Here Secretary of State Henry Kissinger presented "Project Independence," the 
objective being United States self-sufficiency in energy (Randall, 2005: 289). Later that 
year, the countries met again in Paris to establish a mechanisnl to counter OPEC. Thus, 
the International Energy Agency (lEA) was founded which set up arrangements 
regarding sharing oil supplies during emergencies. The lEA also called for the creation of 
petroleum reserves by its members. Otherwise, the "Nixon Administration policy towards 
the embargo shifted between behind the scenes diplomacy and some saber rattling in 
public" (Randall, 2005: 289). Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy "convinced Arab states to 
resume shipments of oil to Western states in March 1974" (Hahn, 2005: 60). The oil 
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embargo crisis cost t.he United States approximately $15 billion during just the first 
quarter of 1974 (Randall, 2005: 290). This was the price America paid for supporting 
Israel over the desires of Arab producers and not succumbing to oil pressures over other 
foreign policy objectives. 
United States energy and security policy has been shaped by the threat of the oil 
weapon since the 1973 embargo (Kretzman, 2003). "The current energy security system 
was created in response to the 1973 Arab oil embargo to ensure coordination among the 
industrialized countries in the event of a disruption in supply, encourage collaboration on 
energy policies, avoid bruising scraInbles for supplies, and deter any future use of an "oil 
weapon" by exporters" (Yergin, 2006). Key elements of current coordinated energy and 
foreign policy between the United States and other importing nations towards the oil 
threats of OPEC and other oil cartels are: the International Energy Agency, including the 
maintenance of domestic petroleum reserves; energy conservation; coordination in case 
of oil disruptions to ensure the sharing of supplies; and the observation and analysis of oil 
market conditions and changes (Yergin, 2006). 
The members of OPEC have very different foreign policy concerns; but through 
the cartel, the primary goal of each is to maximize profits from oil (Houthakker, 1981: 
316). During the 1973 oil embargo, OPEC's announced "5 percent monthly production 
cutbacks were canceled within a month. By December 25, OPEC agreed to a 10 percent 
increase in January production. The promise to tie oil exports to Israeli withdrawal from 
Palestine had a shelf life of only two months" (Taylor, 2001). The embargo was 
terminated for economic, not political reasons. "OPEC's cover story was an attempt to 
win a few foreign policy points for actions it would have taken anyway ... Never once 
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have they allowed foreign policy considerations to get in the way of the bottom line, self­
serving declarations to the contrary notwithstanding" (Taylor, 2001). 
The oil crisis of 1973 was a wake up call to policymakers in Washington. The 
U.S. was forced to realize the power of OPEC and the demands of oil exporting 
countries. "The growing economic power of OPEC enables them to resist U.S. pressure 
on a variety of issues from human rights to nuclear proliferation" (Luft, 2005: 5). Also 
demonstrated by the embargo was the cost America would pay in choosing support of 
Israel over foreign policy dictated by the petroleum factor. The oil embargo "dramatized 
America's dependence on imported oil and the consequences of its insatiable appetite for 
energy" (Feldman, 1996: 1). The result was a modification in our national energy strategy 
to include creation of the lEA and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Fortunately for the 
United States, a similar embargo today would be improbable "because of increased 
flexibility and diversity of supply and more abundant energy reserves" (Feldman, 1996: 
12). 
Iraq 
Iraq is positioned centrally in the Persian Gulf - an area with more than 60 
percent of all the world's oil reserves (Collina, 2005: 3). Iraq's proven oil reserves are, 
second only to Saudi Arabia, 11 percent of global reserves (Barnes, Jaffe, and Morse, 
2003). Some estimate that Iraq could possibly have as much as 220 billion barrels in 
reserves, which is about 80 percent of Saudi Arabian reserves (Kretzman, 2003). 
Additionally, Iraq is the sixth largest importer ofpetroleum to the United States (United 
States National Energy Policy, 2001: 8-4). 
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Like the other Middle Eastern oil producing countries, Iraq gained considerable 
importance after World War II. However, in June of 1967 Iraq dissolved diplomatic 
relations with the United States following the Arab-Israeli Six Day War. Iraq claimed that 
the United States had colluded to support Israel (Lesch, 2003: 328). Although petroleum 
imports continued to flow into the U.S. market, the countries did not have a good 
relationship. After the oil embargo and Yom Kippur War of 1973, Iraq was influenced by 
its dismal economic situation and attempted to improve relations with the West (Lesch, 
2003: 328). 
Although the U.S previously enjoyed a close relationship with Iran, the political 
climate changed when the Shah was overthrown during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The 
United States was not given preferential treatment by the new government, and U.S. 
relations with Iran deteriorated. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, "the United States 
criticized the invasion, but its real attitude was very different. .. Saddam Hussein attacked 
a state that had taken Americans hostage and was most hostile to the United States" 
(Lesch, 2003: 328). The United States realized Iraq's energy potential, and could not risk 
Iraq's defeat to Iran. 
At a time during the Cold War, the United States was encouraged to assist Iraq 
because of its position counter to the Soviets. Washington decided to provide Iraq with 
both direct and indirect assistance. This included "battlefield intelligence; Operation 
Staunch, designed to deprive Iran of arms; support in the United Nations (UN) for a 
resolution calling for a cease-fire; and reflagging Kuwaiti tankers" to protect against 
Iranian gunboat attacks (Lesch, 2003: 329). Secretary of State Kissinger facilitated 
negotiations between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran which helped to in1prove 
Washington'S position in Baghdad (Lesch, 2003: 328). Due to considerable damage to 
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the petroleum production and distribution structure in Iraq caused by the war, Iraq could 
not produce or export petroleum at a substantial level (Houthakker, 1981: 315). After the 
war, the United States strongly supported a Jordanian-Iraqi pipeline which was designed 
to help prevent an economic collapse in Iraq (Lesch, 2003: 329). 
The U.S.-Iraqi relationship was again strained when the war concluded. Both 
sides began to see glaring differences in their foreign policies. Obstacles to a working 
relationship included human rights issues; the Iraqi accumulation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs); opposite stances on Israel; and Iraq's apparent support for terrorist 
groups in Palestine (Lesch, 2003: 329). It was becoming obvious to Saddam Hussein that 
the United States would not allow him to dominate the Persian Gulf as he desired. 
"Saddam offered President Bush a guarantee ... that oil would flow undisturbed ... at a 
"reasonable price" of $25 per barrel. In return he expected U.S. acceptance of the 
annexation of Kuwait and Iraq's status as senior U.S. ally in the Gulf' (Lesch, 2003: 
344). 
President Bush would not accept the annexation. If Iraq captured Kuwait, it would 
control over 21 percent of global oil supplies. And if Iraq had control over these 
enonnous Persian Gulfresources, it "would have a 'stranglehold' on the economy of 
most of the nations of the world" (Le Billon and EI Khatib, 2004: 124). Baghdad 
concluded that it could no longer cooperate with the United States. Washington was 
preventing Iraq's desire for "Gulf and Arab hegemony and what [Iraq] saw as its 
legitimate national security interests" (Lesch, 2003: 345). 
On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein commanded his troops to enter Kuwait. In 
the process, Iraq took control of the Rumailah oil field (Randall, 2005: 301). "Iraq 
justified its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by accusing it of tapping into cross-border oil 
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fields and maintaining a low price policy which undermined Iraqi oil revenues, ultimately 
resulting in a devastating combination of war, economic sanctions, domestic rebellion 
and internal repression" (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004: 112). President Bush took the 
lead and responded immediately. America would not allow Kuwait's sovereignty to be 
disregarded. U.S. troops were sent to protect Saudi Arabia and to build a coalition force 
"designed to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait as well as to defend neighboring countries 
from potential Iraqi aggression" (Randall, 2005: 301). The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 
was an easy victory for the United States and its allies. They succeeded in defeating the 
Iraqi military and pushing Saddam's power back within the boundaries of Iraq. 
Soon after, the lTN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 which imposed 
comprehensive sanctions on Iraq (Randall, 2005: 302). In the years after the Persian Gulf 
War, Iraq's oil production continued to decline. Initially, the sanctions prevented 
countries from purchasing Iraqi oil. In 1995 the UN approved the Oil for Food Program 
which allowed Iraq to sell its oil in the global market as long as the proceeds went 
towards food, medical drugs and equipment, or humanitarian needs of Iraqi citizens. Iraq 
was restricted from rebuilding its military or continuing to acquire WMDs. 
Washington was forced to reassess its policy towards Iraq following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. The George W. Bush administration decided to invade 
Iraq on claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Vice President 
Cheney stated the importance of energy security in the Persian Gulf to the U.S. when he 
stated that: 
((should [Hussein's) ambitions [to acquire weapons ofmass destruction} be 
realized, the implications would be enormous for the Middle East and the United 
States ... Armed with an arsenal ofthese weapons ofterror and a seat at the top of 
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10% ofthe world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek 
domination ofthe entire Middle East, take control ofa great portion ofthe 
world's energy supplies, [and} directly threaten America's friends throughout the 
region. " (Klare (b), 2004) 
Oil has become a central issue in America's War in Iraq, especially in the eye of 
the media. The administration repeatedly asserted that oil was not a factor in the decision 
to invade Iraq in 2003. However, the Bush administration cannot deny the importance of 
Iraqi oil after the U.S. invasion, regardless ofwhether or not it was the reason for 
invasion. As such, Washington must carefully design its approach to the petroleum 
resources of the country. In planning for the Iraqi invasion, the Department ofDefense 
crafted strategies that "sought to capture Iraq's oilfields intact to provide a source of 
revenue for the reconstruction of the country" (Klare (b), 2004). The aim was to secure 
and protect Iraqi oil fields in order to prevent their destruction during the invasion and 
subsequent conflicts within Iraq. 
Arguments disclaiming Washington's oil motivations for the war assert that the 
United States would not expend the magnificent cost and military effort to obtain oil, a 
commodity that can easily be purchased in the open global market (Le Billon and EI 
Khatib, 2004: 121-22). Additionally, Iraq's production has remained stagnant. There have 
been no technological advances or significant investments in the Iraqi oil industry since 
its war with Iran. "Iraq will remain a relatively marginal oil producer for years to come" 
(Le Billon and EI Khatib, 2004: 122).4 
Washington and Baghdad place a high priority on the speedy recovery of the Iraqi 
oil sector (Barnes, Jaffe, and Morse, 2003). "Iraqis place a premium on the restoration of 
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the country's energy infrastructure. A future regime will be legitimated more by its 
delivery of services - including provision of energy - than by its commitment to 
democracy" (Gvosdev, 2003). The U.S. government will have to demonstrate that the 
profits from future oil sells benefit the Iraqi citizens (Le Billon and EI Khatib, 2004: 
133). "What is good for the United States may not be good for a post-Saddam regime in 
Baghdad" (Barnes, Jaffe, and Morse, 2003), and the United States will have to put its 
interests aside for control of Iraqi oil. Until a stable, internationally recognized 
government is established in Baghdad, the UN Security Council has decided that the 
"proceeds of all export sales of petroleum shall be deposited into a Development Fund for 
Iraq, to be used 'in a transparent manner ... for purposes benefiting the people of Iraq'" 
(Le Billon and EI Khatib, 2004: 128). 
No American oil con1panies were pennitted to do business in or with Iraq during 
the period after the Persian Gulf War. However, son1e companies from states supporting 
the U.S. led Iraqi invasion had developed interests in Iraqi oil. The United States will be 
judged based on how the Iraq's petroleum resources are handled. 
"Several key tests will help determine the place ofoil interests in the outcome of 
the war, including the preferential awarding ofIraqi-paid reconstruction and oil 
infrastructure rehabilitation contracts to US firms close to the administration; the 
cancellation or significant modification ofcurrent oil development contracts of 
(non- US) companies; non-competitive awarding ofcontracts to US/UK oil 
companies; and the privatization ofthe Iraqi National Oil Company in a manner 
preferential to US/UK interests. " (Le Billon and EI Khatib, 2004: 123) 
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Since World War II, United States relations with Iraq have been plagued with 
conflict. The United States has asserted the role in the international community of 
protecting the Middle East from Saddam Hussein, whether the threat is real or 
exaggerated. Iraq's oil reserves make the country critical to both the future of U.S. energy 
and national security. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter declared that the "secure flow of 
oil from the Persian Gulf was in "the vital interests of the United States of America" and 
that America would use "any n1eans necessary, including military force" to protect those 
interests from outside forces" (Collina, 2005: 3). The first Bush administration used the 
Carter Doctrine to justify the Gulf War, and the future decisions about Iraq's oil industry 
n1ade by the second Bush administration will determine the role of oil in the invasion of 
Iraq (Collina, 2005: 3). 
2001 National Energy Policy Examination 
((As the NEPDG began its review ofU.s. energy policy, its members saw the 
United States was faced with a grave choice between two widely diverging paths. 
It could continue down the road it had long been traveling, consuming increasing 
amounts ofpetroleum and - given the irreversible decline in domestic oil 
production - becoming ever more dependent on imported supplies. Or, it could 
choose an alternate route ofreliance on renewable sources ofenergy and 
gradually reducing petroleum use. 11 (Klare (b), 2004) 
In March 2001, within months of becoming president, George Bush developed a 
National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) whose task was "to examine 
every aspect of the nation's energy situation" (Klare (a), 2004: 57). Although the NEPDG 
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researched all sources of energy (wind, solar, hydrogen, natural gas, nuclear, etc.), the 
group realized the special importance of oil, and the focus of this paper will be the policy 
in relation to oil. The group consisted of the secretaries from many of the major executive 
offices: state, treasury, interior, agriculture, commerce, transportation, and energy as well 
as other high-ranking officials in various agencies. The NEPDG was headed by Vice 
President Dick Cheney and the report is therefore sometimes referred to as the Cheney 
Report. 
In his letter to President Bush upon completion of the National Energy Policy 
(NEP) in May 2001, Cheney stated that they had "developed a national energy policy 
deigned to help bring together business, government, local communities and citizens to 
promote dependable, affordable and environmentally sound energy for the future." The 
NEP consists of eight sections discussing: the energy challenges facing the United States; 
the impacts of high energy prices on families, communities, and businesses; sustaining 
the nation's health and the environment; increasing energy conservation and efficiency; 
increasing domestic energy supplies; increasing America's use of renewable and 
alternative energy; a comprehensive delivery system; and enhancing national energy 
security and international relationships. 
The National Energy Policy first recognizes that the United States faces its "most 
serious energy shortage since the oil enlbargoes of the 1970s" (2001: viii). The U.S. faces 
challenges in encouraging energy conservation, renovating our energy infrastructure, and 
implementing environmentally friendly ways to increase our energy supply (2001: ix). It 
notes that if current trends continue, the United States will have "increased dependence 
on foreign powers that do not always have America's interests at heart" (2001: x). 
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To avoid this, the group urges "action to meet five specific national goals. 
America n1ust modernize conservation, modernize our energy infrastructure, increase 
energy supplies, accelerate the protection and improvement of the environment, and 
increase our nation's energy security" (2001: xi). The NEPDG recommends increasing 
funding for renewable energy, alternative energy resources and energy efficiency 
research; this includes wind, solar, biomass, geothennal, coal, hydrogen, and nuclear 
(2001: xiv). "The President's goal of reliable, affordable, and environmentally sound 
energy supplies will not be reached overnight. It will call forth innovations in science, 
research, and engineering" (2001: xv). 
Although the United States is the third-largest oil-producing country in the world, 
our production is not sufficient to meet demand. There are numerous limiting factors the 
NEPDG discovered to increasing domestic production: "economic and technological 
factors associated with depletion of the fossil fuel resource base in the U.S.; regulatory 
uncertainty; limitations on access to federal lands with high potentials for new 
discoveries; infrastructure constraints;: .. and conflicts with legitimate land use, 
environmental, and other public policy goals" (2001: 5-1). The shortfall between 
production and demand can be made up by importing more energy, improving energy 
efficiency, and/or increasing domestic energy supply. 
In order to reduce foreign dependence on oil, the United States must improve 
efficiency, reduce demand, and increase energy input from domestic sources. Since a 
large portion of oil consumption is in the transportation sector, energy policy is especially 
pertinent to motor vehicles.5 The NEP suggests reducing demand through increased 
conservation, vehicle efficiency, and alternative fuels as well as by car pooling or using 
mass transportation (2001: 4-10). 
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The U.S. government owns over 30 percent of the nation's land, and public lands 
account for approximately 30 percent of our domestic annual production (2001: 5-6). 
Portions of this land are restricted for environmental, defense or various administrative 
uses. The National Energy Policy advocates opening a small portion of the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) for oil development (2001: xiv). Large amounts of 
recoverable oil resources are contained on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), of which 
610 million acres is off linlits to development (2001: 5-7). The Arctic OCS, where 
ANWR is located, is estimated to contain 22.5 billion barrels of oil (2001: 5-8). The 
NEPDG contends that "ANWR production could equal 46 years of current imports from 
Iraq" (2001: 5-9). 
National energy security depends on adequate supplies of energy to support 
global economic growth (2001: 8-1). "We are self-sufficient in virtually all our energy 
resources except oil" (2001: 8-3). United States dependence on foreign sources of oil is 
expected to intensify. Recognizing that considerable resources will be imported, "energy 
security nlust be a priority of U.S. trade and foreign policy" (2001: xv). The United 
States must try to restore its credibility with the oil exporting countries and strengthen 
relationships within our hemisphere. 
Throughout the report, the National Energy Policy Development Group evaluates 
the current United States energy conditions and makes predictions about the future of 
energy in our nation. After examining each source of energy and every aspect relating to 
energy security, the NEPDG makes a total of 105 policy recommendations. These 
recommendations range from preparing for potential natural disasters, to increasing 
public awareness of savings associated with Energy Star products, to construction of new 
pipelines between Canada and the United States. 
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Here are some of the recommendations I feel are notable in relation to our 
considerable foreign dependence for oil (please note: this is a random sampling, not a 
complete list): 
• 	 Creating a "Royalties Conservation Fund" that will earmark potentially billions of 
dollars from new oil production in ANWR to fund land conservation efforts 
• 	 Directing the Secretary of Energy to promote greater energy efficiency 
• 	 Directing the Secretary of Transportation to review and provide recommendations 
on Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that should increase 
efficiency without hurting the automobile industry 
• 	 Directing the Secretary of Treasury and Congress to work together on legislation to 
increase energy efficiency with a tax credit for fuel-efficient vehicles; including 
income tax credit for purchase of new hybrid fuel cell vehicles 
• 	 Developing ways to reduce petroleun1 den1and by working with the trucking 
industry to reduce emissions and fuel consumption 
• 	 Promoting enhanced oil and gas recovery from existing wells through new 
technology, and improving exploration technology through partnership with public 
and private entities 
• 	 Considering economic incentives for environmentally sound offshore oil and gas 
development 
• 	 Authorizing exploration and development of the 1002 area of ANWR 
• 	 Reassessing limitations on federal lands in order to increase renewable energy 
production such as biomass, solar, wind, and geothermal 





• Continuing the ethanol excise tax exemption 
• 	 Directing the Secretary of the Interior to renew progress of the Trans-Alaskan 
Pipeline System to ensure oil flows uninterrupted from Alaska to the West Coast 
• 	 Taking steps to ensure America has sufficient refining capacity to meet the 
demands of customers, adopting comprehensive regulations, and providing more 
regulatory certainty to refinery owners 
• 	 Making energy security a priority of our trade and foreign policy 
• 	 Supporting initiatives to open up areas of foreign energy sectors to American 
investment 
• 	 Continuing supporting American energy firms competing in markets abroad, and 
implementing a system of clear, open, and transparent rules over foreign investment 
• 	 Initiating a comprehensive review of U.S. sanctions on oil producing countries; 
energy security should be a factor 
• 	 Supporting the BTC oil pipeline 
• 	 Deepening the commercial dialogue with the Caspian states to provide a strong, 
transparent, and stable business climate for energy and related infrastructure 
projects 
• 	 Supporting exports of U.S. clean energy technologies and encourage their 
development overseas 
• 	 Increasing international cooperation on finding alternatives to oil, especially for the 
transportation sector 
• 	 Calling for an annual meeting of G-8 Energy ministers, or their foreign equivalents 
• 	 Ensuring that lEA member states fulfill their stockholding capacities 
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• Reaffinning that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is designed for addressing an 
imminent or actual disruption in oil supplies, and not for managing prices 
• 	 Strengthening our trade alliances and working for greater oil production in Africa, 
the Caspian, and the Western hemisphere 
As evidenced by the examples above, the National Energy Policy 
recommendations include a wide variety ofproposals to help increase our energy and 
national security. Some have argued that this recommendation list is incoherent and 
counterproductive. In the United States, the liberals generally push for greater 
conservation while the conservatives argue for increased domestic production (Barnes, 
Jaffe, and Morse, 2003). These policy recommendations do not limit our energy policy to 
a single approach. The NEPDG suggests making steps in diverse directions all working 
toward the ultimate goal of less energy dependency. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
{{The Stone Age did not end because we ran out ofrocks. The oil age will likely be 
with us for decades to come. " (Ebel, 2005) 
Oil is the foundation of industrial society and imperative to the transportation 
sector in the United States. As our domestic reserves are depleting and our petroleum 
demand is increasing, the United States increasingly relies on foreign countries to supply 
us with necessary oil. Oil dependency is a real problem. The United States is in a position 
where it is beholden to other nations for this important source of energy. Consequently, 
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since World War II, the United States energy policies and foreign policies have 
progressively become more interconnected. 
Since President Jimmy Carter announced in 1980 that the secure flow of oil from 
the Middle East was in the vital interest of the United States and that America would use 
"any means necessary, including military force" to protect this interest, the Carter 
Doctrine has been a central justification for the use of force in modem United States oil 
policy (Collina, 2005: 3). I suggest that the United States is not erroneous in its use of 
military force to protect oil interests in the Persian Gulf, or the world. Oil is an important 
component of our national security, and we must be prepared to defend our national 
security. However, I believe this doctrine should be reexamined. We should not abandon 
our "alliances and security agreements with friendly, democratic states for defense 
against mutual threats;" however we should avoid military use to arm and "protect 
unden10cratic, repressive regimes for the sole purpose of making sure their oil continues 
to flow our way" (Collina, 2005: 6). Additionally, a fundamental aspect of our foreign 
policy should be respect for the sovereignty of nations. Our primary goal should be 
encouraging diplomatic negotiations rather than military force. "The intersection ... 
between the two imperatives of keeping the world "safe" and keeping the world 
"powered" will preoccupy American foreign policymakers in the years to come" 
(Gvosdev, 2003). 
Also important in our international relations is our cooperation with other oil­
importing nations. "It remains critical for oil importing countries to bind themselves 
collectively to meet pending disruptions" (Barnes, Jaffe, and Morse, 2003). Additionally, 
other oil-importing countries share vulnerabilities in oil dependence and therefore share 
the desire to pursue alternative sources of energy. Our foreign energy policy should 
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reflect our commitment to share in the research and development of new technologies 
that will alleviate oil dependency. "The issue of oil is not a uniquely American problem, 
and policymakers should therefore not pursue a uniquely American solution" (Woolsey, 
2004). 
Our energy demands should not bring about a fall of U.S. hegemony to foreign oil 
producers. In order to circumvent the risks and vulnerabilities of oil dependency, the 
United States must begin taking steps now to alleviate our dependency. This requires a 
mulit-faceted transitional approach. The United States will not be weaned off oil 
overnight. We are currently a fossil fuel-based economy. A radical change is not likely. 
The United States should take deliberate but incremental steps towards a new energy era. 
Neither the United States nor the world will run out of oil in the near future; however, we 
should immediately begin taking the first steps in order to be prepared for that time or a 
time when oil exporting countries abuse their energy power. Like the National Energy 
Policy recommends, we must take steps to not only decrease our oil demands and usage, 
but we must also take steps to conserve energy, increase domestic supplies, and improve 
relations with oil exporting countries. 
Alternative sources of energy are the key to America's future. The United States 
must be dedicated to the research and development of renewable, environmentally 
friendly, and affordable sources of energy. The major oil companies, car manufacturers, 
and various other sectors of American business have a large stake in the development of 
new fuels which will overtake the demand for oil. The government should encourage 
private companies to promote new sources of energy that will benefit not only the 
companies' pocketbooks, but also the greater good of society. Furthermore, the U.S. 
government should provide economic funding, tax breaks, and incentives to consumers 
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who choose new alternative fuels and sources of energy over petroleum and to the 
companies who design and produce them. 
Even with successful integration of new energy sources and alternative fonns of 
energy, portions of U.S. society will continue to need and demand some amount of oil. 
The Middle East will become more powerful as petroleum resources in the rest of the world 
become scarce. The Persian Gulf countries have the benefit of holding two-thirds of the 
world's proven oil reserves. It is therefore important to maintain strong international 
relations with these countries without sacrificing our ideologies and U.S. security. History 
should not be neglected or forgotten, but diplomacy is the key for the future. 
In the post September 11 world, terrorism is a continuous threat. The United 
States should therefore vigorously guard our energy infrastructure from terrorist attacks. 
The United States should be prepared to protect U.S. oil tankers and foreign oil tankers 
shipping to the U.S. It should also take steps to protect oil pipelines, ports, oil fields, 
refineries and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 
As this paper shows, the effects of petroleum dependence on our country are 
enonnous. In foreign policy, the United States has given demand for oil an important role 
in the decision making process. The U.S. government should encourage the United States 
to take the lead globally in the process of converting our economy from hydrocarbon 
based to an economy founded on renewable, economical, and environmentally friendly 
energies in order to alleviate our vulnerabilities to foreign oil producers. However the 
market and the American public seemingly support the current state of oil dependence. 
Before the popUlation will encourage a real transition in the economy away from 
petroleum reliance, economic incentives are necessary. The evolution of an U.S. 
economy based on petroleum requires the govenunent to set priorities and take realistic 
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steps towards change. Two fundamental objectives are: first, to discover and develop a 
new energy direction for the United States; and second, to free our foreign policy from 
the restraints of oil dependence. 
In order to achieve these goals, the initial step of the United States should be to 
place an increased federal tax on the sale of petroleum products. Since the transportation 
sector relies almost 100% on oil and accounts for nearly 65% of the oil consumed in the 
United States each year, this sector should be taxed most heavily through increased 
gasoline and diesel fuel taxes. Washington should then use these revenues dually for 
funding research and development of alternative fuels and sources of energy and for 
providing incentives to companies manufacturing successful new products and the 
customers who purchase them. Although this approach will likely be controversial and 
unpopular with the American public, sufficiently increased prices will provide the 
necessary motivation for the development of alternative fuels and sources of energy and 
induce the public, the market, and research and development groups to energetically 
move away from petroleum dependence. 
Washington n1ust be careful not to interfere too greatly in the transition. After 
placing the increased petroleum tax and appropriately distributing the revenue for 
research and development, the government should let the market work. As gasoline prices 
increase and successful energy alternatives become available, the population will begin to 
demand the new products, and these new products will become more affordable. The 
direction of new fuels and technology will largely be a result of popUlation demands, 
available technology, and results of research and development. The government should 
playa minimal oversight role to ensure that the new energy course is in the best long­
tenn interest of the United States versus a quick fix with additional future problems. 
53 

Although a radical change is not expected overnight, a gradual shift away from oil 
reliance will eventually allow the United States more freedom in developing its foreign 
policy. Ultimately, Washington should be able to formulate policies without being 
captive to our energy dependence and the pressures of oil exporting countries. An 
incremental transition to alternative energy sources will eventually push oil concerns far 
down the priority list of foreign policy objectives. Beginning with a federal tax on 
transportation fuels and ending with the development of a new direction in U.S. energy 
policy, the United States will be on the road to greater freedom in our national security. 
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Major Sources of U.S. Petroleum Imports, 2001 * 
Total Petroleum Crude Oil Refined Product 
Canada 1.83 1.36 0.47 
Saudi Arabia 1.66 1.61 0.05 
Venezuela 1.55 1.29 0.26 
Mexico 1.44 1.39 0.05 
Nigeria 0.89 0.84 0.04 
Iraq 0.80 0.80 0.00 
Norway 0.34 0.28 0.06 
Angola 0.33 0.32 0.01 
United Kingdom 0.32 0.24 0.08 
Algeria 0.28 0.01 0.27 
U.S. Virgin Islands 0.27 0.00 0.27 
Kuwait 0.25 0.23 0.01 
Total Imports 11.87 9.33 2.54 
Source: Energy Infonnation Administration 
*Table includes all countries from which the U.S. imported more than 200,000 barrels 
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I At this point, there are no agreed upon standards for reserves calculations (Kretzman). 

2 One barrel of crude oil equals 42 gallons. After refining, a barrel yields almost 20 gallons of 

gasoline (United States, DoE, Energy Information Agency). 

3 Abdulah Tariki of Saudi Arabia and Perez Alfonso of Venezuela took the lead in establishing 

OPEC (Randall 264). 

4 Currently Iraq produces only 2 percent of global oil production. It might take several years for it 

to reach a 6-7 percent mark of global production (Le Billon and El Khatib 122). 

5 Approximately 65 percent of the oil consumed each year is used for transportation (United 

States, National Energy Policy 6-8). 
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